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Chapter 2:  Regional Standards on Action against Transnational Organised Crime   
 
2.1 Introduction   
 
This Chapter analyses the development of regional standards relating to action against 
organised crime, with a particular focus on European Union Law.  It begins with an analysis 
of core principles of approximation of national criminal laws and procedures and mutual 
recognition of judicial decision.  It will be shown that the EU and its Member States have 
been instrumental in promoting these principles.    The Chapter continues with the analysis of 
core obligations established by the relevant legal instruments which mirrors the discussions 
of the international standards in the previous Chapter.   The important international 
obligations and standards are indeed implemented through European Union Law, thereby 
demonstrating a degree of synergy among the different levels of governance, although it 
becomes simultaneously evident that the measures adopted under the European Union Law 
are more advanced and progressive than those under the UNTOC.  Finally, protection and 
promotion of human rights will be explored.  While the EU and its Member States have made 
some progress in this area, the European Convention of Human Rights 1950 continues to play 
a significant role in this regard.   
  
2.2 Core Principles 
 The first relevant principle is approximation of national criminal laws and procedures.  
While its importance was recognised in the 1990s, it was the Treaty on European Union as 
revised by the Treaty of Amsterdam which formally introduced this principle into under the 
EU legal order.1  It has also been recognised by the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU)2 which has restructured the pre-existing treaty arrangements.  For 
instance, Article 82(1) states that judicial co-operation in criminal matters shall include 
approximation of the laws and regulations of Member States in the following areas:  a) 
mutual admissibility of evidence, b) the rights of individuals in criminal procedure, c) the 
rights of victims, d) any other specific aspects of criminal procedure which the Council has 
identified in advance by a decision.  Article 83 additional provides for the establishment of 
minimum rules on the definitions and sanctions of serious offences with cross-border 
dimensions, such as trafficking in human beings and sexual exploitation of women and 
children, illicit drug trafficking, illicit arms trafficking, money laundering, corruption, 
counterfeiting of means of payment, computer crime and organised crime.     
In terms of legal instruments, so-called framework decisions have been adopted under 
the TEU.  Many of these are still relevant today until they are amended or repealed.   
Although framework decisions are legally binding, they do not entail direct effect,3 meaning 
that they cannot be directly enforceable by national courts and tribunals of Member States.  
Under the TFEU, directives are to be used to achieve approximation as stipulated in Articles 
82(2) and 83(1).   Article 288 provides that “a directive shall be binding, as to the result to be 
achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national 
authorities the choice of form and methods.”  Member States therefore have some flexibility 
in implementing approximation of national laws to combat transnational organised crime.  
One noticeable difference between directives and framework decisions is that the former can 
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 Arts. 29 and 31 of the Treaty on European Union as revised by the Treaty of Amsterdam.  On the historical 
development of this context within the EU legal order, see Anne Weyembergh, ‘The Functions of 
Approximation of Penal Legislation within the European Union’ (2005) 12 Maastricht Journal of European and 
Comparative Law 149; and Francesco Calderoni, Organized Crime Legislation in the European Union (Springer 
2010).  
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 [2012] OJ C 326/47.   
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 Art. 34.   
entail direct effect.  This is because Article 288 does not exclude this possibility unlike 
Article 34 of the TEU in relation to framework decisions.  In addition, infringement 
proceedings before the European Court of Justice (ECJ) can now be instituted against 
Member States which fail to implement directives.4   The importance of these changes is that 
they will put additional pressures on Member States to take organised crime more seriously 
and strengthen their action compared to the old regime.    However, Article 276 of the TFEU 
simultaneously states that the ECJ does not have jurisdiction to review the validity or 
proportionality of operations carried out by the police and other law enforcement services, 
and this unfortunately undermines the ability of the ECJ to provide independent oversight 
over some aspects of the action against transnational organised crime within the EU 
territories.  
The second important principle is mutual recognition of judicial decisions in relation 
to criminal matters.  This idea was first introduced by the UK during its Presidency in 1998 to 
promote judicial co-operation in this area throughout Member States.5  It was also recognised 
in the following year in the Tampere Conclusions, where the principle was regarded as the 
cornerstone of criminal judicial co-operation.6  In 2000 the European Commission consulted 
the matter with the Council and the European Parliament7 and launched an initiative to 
promote this principle in the following year.8  Finally, the Hague Programme, established to 
strengthen the Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice, reaffirmed the importance of this 
principle in preventing and suppressing serious crime.9  Therefore, mutual recognition was 
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 Art. 258 of the TFEU.    
5
 Valsamis Mitsilegas, ‘The Constitutional Implications of Mutual Recognition in Criminal Matters in the EU’ 
(2006) 43 Common Market Law Review 1277, 1278. 
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 Tampere Presidency Conclusions, para. 33.  
7
 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on Mutual Recognition of 
Final Decisions in Criminal Matters, COM (2000) 495 final.   
8
 Programme of Measures to Implement the Principle of Mutual Recognition of Decisions in Criminal Matters, 
[2001] OJ C 12/10.   
9
 [2005] OJ C53/1. 
clearly relevant under the TEU.  Under the TFEU, mutual recognition is specifically 
mentioned in Article 82.   The legal instruments are largely the same for mutual recognition 
under the TEU and the TFEU (i.e. framework decisions and directives).   
The principles of approximation of national criminal laws/procedures and mutual 
recognition are closely interlinked.  To begin with, the main factor which encouraged the EU 
and Member States to promote the mutual recognition principle was the divergence among 
national legal systems which undermined effective law enforcement co-operation.10  
Undoubtedly, mutual recognition becomes easier if approximation of national criminal laws 
and processes is achieved to a greater degree.  In this sense approximation can be regarded as 
a tool to promote mutual recognition.11  However, the latter does not necessarily require the 
former.  It has been noted in this regard that the aim of approximation is to eliminate 
differences, while these differences are recognised under mutual recognition.12  The 
European Court of Justice also held that nothing in Title VI of the TEU has made the 
application of the principle of mutual recognition conditional upon harmonisation of criminal 
laws of Member States.13  For this reason, the principle of mutual recognition has been 
regarded as a good alternative to approximation of national laws and procedures as it does not 
require substantial alteration.14   Finally, it is evident that the EU and its Member States have 
been more willing to acknowledge explicitly the importance of two core principles in 
comparison with international law on transnational organised crime.   
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 Mitsilegas, supra  n 5, 1278.   
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 Massimo Fichera, ‘The European Arrest Warrant and the Sovereign State: A Marriage of Convenience?’ 
(2009) 15 European Law Journal 70, 77.     
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 Case C-303/05 Advocaten voor de Wereld v Leden van de Ministerraad [2007] ECR I-3633, para. 59.   
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2.3 EU Action against Transnational Organised Crime 
2.3.1 Prohibition of Organised Crime and Criminal Jurisdictions 
 Having explored two key principles under EU Law, it is now useful to analyse how 
they are reflected and implemented in relation to transnational organised crime.   In relation 
to prohibition of organised crime, an important instrument is the Framework Decision on the 
Fight against Organised Crime15 adopted in 2008.   Under Article 1, the Framework Decision 
defines ‘criminal organisation’ as: 
a structured association, established over a period of time, of more than two persons acting in concert 
with a view to committing offences which are punishable by deprivation of liberty or a detention order 
of a maximum of at least four years or a more serious penalty, to obtain, directly or indirectly, a 
financial or other material benefit;  
‘structured association’ means an association that is not randomly formed for the immediate 
commission of an offence, nor does it need to have formally defined roles for its members, continuity 
of its membership, or a developed structure. 
While this definition is largely in line with the one under the UNTOC, one noticeable 
difference is the number of individuals (i.e. two persons as opposed to three) needed to form 
a criminal organisation.  The offences relating to participation in a criminal organisation also 
mirror those under the UNTOC16 and the Framework Decision allows a degree of flexibility 
for Member States to choose between the conspiracy or participation models.    
In relation to substantive crimes, there are other instruments which emphasise the 
obligation to prohibit.17   An important point to note, however, is that there is currently no 
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 Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA, [2008] OJ L 300/42.   
16
 Arts. 2 and 3.   
17
 See for instance, Convention drawn up on the basis of Article K.3(2)(c) of the Treaty on European Union on 
the fight against corruption involving officials of the European Communities or officials of the Member States 
of the European Union, [1997] OJ C 195/2; Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA of 22 July 2003 on 
combating corruption in the private sector, [2003] OJ 192/54; Framework Decision 2004/757/JHA of 25 
October 2004 laying down minimum provisions on the constituent elements of criminal acts and penalties in the 
field of illicit drug trafficking, [2004] OJ L 335/8; Directive 2011/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 5 April 2011 on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims, 
and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA, [2011] OJ L 101/1; 2011/92/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of 
children and child pornography, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA, OJ L 335/1; and 
clear legal basis obliging Member States to prohibit and punish fiscal or excise fraud such as 
tobacco smuggling or fuel laundering.  In relation to tobacco products, it is important to 
mention that the EU has adopted two Directives in the past.18  In addition, it has concluded 
several agreements with major tobacco companies such as Philip Morris International, Japan 
Tobacco, British American Tobacco and Imperial Tobacco.19  However, the first Directive 
did not contain any criminal law provisions, and given that tobacco smuggling continues to 
exist within the EU territories, its effectiveness in suppressing this crime can be called into 
question.  Similarly, while it is not yet possible to measure the effectiveness of the newest 
Directive, the same argument can be applied.  As to agreements with tobacco companies, 
they will be penalised if they do not put enough effort to tackle tobacco smuggling.20  While 
encouraging co-operation from these corporations is a reasonable step to be taken, the current 
arrangements can be interpreted as shifting the responsibility of crime prevention to private 
entities.  It has also been argued that these agreements have not been entirely effective in 
reducing the crime.21  There is therefore scope for improvement in relation to these crimes 
which are becoming serious as noted previously.    
 Unlike the UNTOC, the EU instruments on substantive crimes goes further to provide 
for punishments to be implemented by Member States.   The participation offences under the 
                                                          
Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of 
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European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directive 2006/70/EC (Text with EEA relevance), 
[2015] OJ L 141/73.  
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 Directive 2001/37/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2001 on the approximation of 
the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning the manufacture, 
presentation and sale of tobacco products, [2001] OJ L194/26; and Directive 2014/40/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 on approximation of laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions of the Member States concerning the manufacture, presentation and sale of tobacco and related 
products repealing Directive 2001/37/EC, [2014] OJ L 127/1.  
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 The European Anti-Fraud Office at <http://ec.europa.eu/anti_fraud/investigations/eu-
revenue/cigarette_smuggling_en.htm>.  
20
 European Parliament,  Workshop on Cigarette Smuggling (January 2014), 39.  
21
 Ibid, 40.   
Framework Decision on Organised Crime, for instance, are to attract the imprisonment of at 
least 2-5 years.22  It also obliges States to designate the involvement of organised criminal 
groups as an aggravating factor in sentencing.  This is important as the involvement of these 
groups naturally make their operations more dangerous and difficult to detect, and a heavier 
penalty might be justified for these reasons.  The Framework Decision on Drug Trafficking 
similarly provides for imprisonment of at least 1-3 years for drug offences.  Article 4 
additionally lists aggravating circumstances with heavier penalties (maximum of at least 5-10 
years imprisonment), which include production/trafficking of large quantities of drugs or 
involvement of organised criminal groups.  Moreover, human trafficking is to incur the 
maximum imprisonment of at least 5 years’ (or 10 years’ under aggravating circumstances).23  
It is evident that these instruments are designed to encourage States to find common grounds 
by establishing minimum thresholds for punishment, and provide clearer guidance compared 
to the UNTOC by promoting approximation of substantive criminal law among Member 
States.    
 In terms of criminal jurisdiction, the rules stipulated in the EU instruments largely 
reflect the international standards as represented by the UNTOC.  Under the Framework 
Decision on Organised Crime, the territorial principle is recognised as a mandatory ground 
for establishing jurisdiction.24  The same provision also mentions the nationality principle 
(for both natural and legal persons), but this is regarded as an optional ground, allowing 
Member States not to prosecute their own nationals. This is in line with the practice of some 
States explained elsewhere.  Interestingly, however, the Directives on Human Trafficking and 
Child Sexual Exploitation make the nationality principle mandatory.  This is particularly 
useful in prosecuting and punishing nationals and habitual residents of the EU Member States 
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 Art. 3.   
23
 Art. 4. 
24
 Art. 7.  
who commit these crimes abroad.25   Aside from the territorial and nationality principles, the 
passive personality and universality principle (i.e. presence of perpetrators without territorial 
or nationality connections, and aut dedere aut judicare) are provided for. 26      
 
2.3.2 Special Investigative Techniques  
 There is no single comprehensive instrument governing the use of special 
investigative techniques under EU Law.  However, Member States are encouraged to use 
them one way or another.  The EU Human Trafficking Directive states in this regard that 
‘Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that effective investigative tools, 
such as those which are used in organised crime or other serious crime cases are available.’27 
This can be interpreted as including measures such as surveillance and interception of 
communications.  These are also mentioned in the context of cross-border co-operation.  The 
Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters between the EU Member States 
200028 encourages measures such as controlled delivery (Article 12), covert investigations 
(Article 14), and interception of communication (Title III).    The Schengen Acquis,29 which 
incorporated the Schengen Agreement 1985 and the Convention 1990 into the EU legal 
framework, also touches upon cross-border surveillance and hot pursuits.30  More recently in 
2014, the Commission and the European Parliament adopted the Directive on European 
Investigation Order.31  This builds upon the previous instruments, most notably the 
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 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Combating Sexual Abuse, Sexual 
Exploitation of Children and Child Pornography, COM (2010) 94 final; and Proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on Preventing and Combating Trafficking in Human Beings and 
Protecting Victims, COM (2010) 95 final.   
26
 Similar provisions are included in the Framework Decision on Drug Trafficking (Art. 8).   
27
 Art. 9(4).   
28
 [2000] OJ C 197/1. 
29
 Protocol 19 to the TFEU.   
30
 Arts. 40 and 41.   
31
 [2014] OJ L 130/1. 
Framework Decision on the European Evidence Warrant.32  Under this regime, investigation 
measures such as covert investigation (Article 29) and interception of communications 
(Chapter V) can be requested and implemented among Member States.   In summary, it is 
apparent that the EU legal frameworks actively encourage Member States to utilise special 
investigative techniques for serious cross-border crimes, including organised crime.   
2.3.3 Confiscation of Criminal Proceeds 
Several instruments have been implemented in relation to confiscation of criminal 
proceeds.  Under the TEU, there were 4 framework decisions on this.33  Among others, a lack 
of a common approach to confiscation, conflicting legal traditions, and a lack of training on 
the part of law enforcement authorities have been raised as key reasons for the ineffectiveness 
of these instruments, and consequently the need for a new instrument was highlighted by the 
European Commission.34  This has also been acknowledged in the Stockholm Programme, 
designed to enhance the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice within the EU, which called 
for more efficient system of asset recovery.35  In response, the Directive 2014/42/EU on the 
freezing and confiscation of instrumentalities and proceeds of crime in the European Union36 
was finally adopted under the TFEU.   
The key features of this Directive can be identified in comparison with the previous 
instruments.  To begin with, the application of this Directive is limited to serious crimes, 
                                                          
32
 [2008] OJ L 350/72.  
33
 Council Framework Decision 2001/500/JHA of 26 June 2001 on money laundering, the identification, tracing, 
freezing, seizing and confiscation of instrumentalities and the proceeds of crime, [2001] OJ L 182/1; Council 
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to confiscation orders, [2006] OJ L 328/59. 
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 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the freezing and confiscation of 
proceeds of crimes in the European Union, COM (2012) 85 final, 7.  
35
 [2010] OJ C 115/1. 
36
 [2014] OJ L 127/39.  
unlike previous instruments which cover crimes which attract imprisonment of 1 year.  
Article 3 in this regard provides a non-exhaustive list of crimes including drug trafficking, 
human trafficking, counterfeiting, terrorism, corruption and participation in organised 
criminal groups.  This Directive also allows both conviction and non-conviction based 
confiscation of proceeds.37  While Article 4(2) stipulates a suspect being ill or having 
absconded as examples of cases where non-conviction based confiscation can be instituted, 
this list is not exhaustive as the term ‘at least’ suggests.   Having said this, whether the 
Directive will actually encourage Member States to allow expansive non-conviction based 
confiscation is open to question as many of them have already opposed to such a measure,38 
although it is widely practiced in the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland as will be 
explored later in this book.   In addition, the rights of the defendants are also specifically 
recognised under the Directive,39 and therefore additional safeguards are to be implemented 
by Member States.   Another important aspect of this Directive is the use of confiscated 
proceeds.  Article 10(3) encourages Member States to use the confiscated proceeds for public 
interest and social purposes.  In addition to enhancing the capability of law enforcement 
agencies in combating transnational crime, these proceeds can be used to protect and 
compensate victims of organised crime, particularly human trafficking and slavery/forced 
labour where the physical and mental well-being are greatly affected.  It has also been 
suggested that these proceeds should be used to assist civil society organisations in educating 
the general public and conducting important activities for prevention of crime.40   The EU 
Directive therefore goes further than the UNTOC.    
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 Art. 4. 
38
 See Michele Simonato, ‘Directive 2014/42/EU and Non-Conviction Based Confiscation: A Step Forward on 
Asset Recovery?’ (2015) 6 New Journal of European Criminal Law 213.  
39
 Art. 8. 
40
 Stefano Montaldo, ‘Directive 2014/42/EU and Social Reuse of Confiscated Assets in the EU: Advancing a 
Culture of Legality’ (2015) 6 New Journal of European Criminal Law 195, 200.   
2.3.4 International Co-operation 
The EU and its Member States have been instrumental in facilitating international co-
operation against transnational organised crime.   In relation to treaties, there are a few 
important ones.   The first is the aforementioned the Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance 
in Criminal Matters between the EU Member States.  Requests for mutual assistance are to be 
made directly by judicial authorities of Member States (Article 6), although spontaneous 
information exchange relating to criminal offences can be conducted without formal requests 
as long as that is permitted in their domestic legal frameworks (Article 7).  Here, the 
promotion of mutual recognition is clear and the Convention aims to facilitate smoother co-
operation on the ground.  In relation to specific measures, the Convention also provides for 
mutual assistance in the temporary transfer of those in custody (Article 9), hearing of 
testimonies by video/telephone conferences (Articles 10 and 11), controlled delivery (Article 
12), covert investigations (Article 14), and interception of communication (Title III).   
The second treaty regime is Schengen Acquis.41  The relevant part is Title III on 
Police and Security.  In addition to facilitating co-operation through judicial authorities, the 
Schengen Acquis allows direct police co-operation when permitted by domestic legal 
frameworks of the EU Member States (Article 39).  Of particular relevance in relation to 
organised crime is a possibility of cross-border surveillance under Article 40.  Normally this 
is done with the express permission of the concerned Member States, but the same provision 
also allows surveillance of up to 5 hours without permission in urgent cases.   The offences 
for which such cross-border surveillance is permitted include human and drug trafficking.  
Article 41 additionally provides for ‘hot pursuit.’  Mutual legal assistance measures are also 
listed in Part 2.    
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 Protocol 19 to the TFEU.  
In addition, there is a treaty aimed to facilitate customs co-operation, which are 
relevant for crimes such as fiscal/excise fraud.  The Convention on Mutual Assistance and 
Co-operation between Customs Administrations 1997 (Naples II),42 adopted under the TEU, 
builds upon the previous Convention on Mutual Assistance between Customs 
Administrations 1967.   The main aim of this Convention is to facilitate co-operation for the 
purpose of preventing, detecting, prosecuting and punishing infringements of EU and 
national customs provisions.43  Key measures stipulated under this instrument include sharing 
of information (Article 10), cross-border surveillance (Article 21), hot pursuit (Article 20), 
controlled delivery (Article 22), overt investigation (Article 23), and JITs (Article 24).  These 
measures therefore are similar to the EU Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Convention 
as well as Schengen Acquis.  In any event, it is apparent that that important international 
standards as represented in the UNTOC are reflected in these treaties.   
There are other legal instruments designed to facilitate smoother international co-
operation.  A prominent example is the European Arrest Warrant (EAW).44  This is the very 
first measure adopted to promote the mutual recognition principle and has simplified the 
extradition procedures among Member States, enabling them to bring criminals to justice 
sooner rather than later.  The EAW regime therefore is a good example of an expedite 
procedure envisaged by Article 16 of the UNTOC.   Among others, participation in a criminal 
organisation, trafficking of human beings, drug and weapons, corruption, and money 
laundering, have been included in the list of offences under which double criminality is 
relaxed,45 thereby allowing Member States to facilitate faster surrender of suspects and 
defendants.  Since its adoption, EAWs have been relied upon by Member States regularly.  
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 [1998] OJ C 24/1. 
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 Art. 1.   
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 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the 
surrender procedures between Member States, [2002] OJ L 190/1.   
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 Art. 2.   
Between 2005 and 2013, a total of 99,841 EAWs have been issued, with the number steadily 
increasing since the adoption.46  The average surrender time for those who have consented to 
extradition was around 15 days, while it has taken approximately 48 days for those who have 
not.47  These clearly demonstrate that the EAW regime has been recognised by the EU 
Member States as an important tool to enhance smoother administration of justice.  The 
European Court of Justice has also been upholding the importance of respecting mutual 
recognition in executing EAWs.48 
Another important arrangement is the establishment of Joint Investigation Teams 
(JITs)49 as envisaged by Article 19 of the UNTOC.  It follows from the aforementioned EU 
Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, but the 9/11 attack in the United 
States and some delay in ratification of the Convention prompted the EU to adopt a separate 
framework decision.50   These JITs aim to facilitate more proactive cross-border 
investigations into serious crimes, including organised crime, by seeking a degree of 
harmonisation on rules governing its operation among Member States.51  They are to be set 
up for specific aims and for limited periods only52 and can be participated not only by 
national police officers, but also by prosecutors and judges, as well as the EU institutions 
such as Europol and Eurojust.53  The available statistical information reveals that JITs has 
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 European Parliament, At Glance: European Arrest Warrant (European Parliament 2014), 1.  It is important to 
remember that not all of these relate to organised crime as EAWs are used for other serious offences such as 
theft, grievous bodily harm and murder.   
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 European Commission, Report on the Implementation since 2007 of the Council Framework Decision of 13 
June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States, SEC (2011) 
430 final, 3.  
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 See for instance, Radu, C-396/11 [2013]; and Melloni, C-399/11 [2013]  
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 [2002] OJ L 162/1.   
50
 Ludo Block, ‘Combating Organised Crime in Europe: Practicalities of Police Cooperation’ (2008) 2 Policing: 
A Journal of Policy and Practice 74, 79.  This Framework Decision will ceased to exist as soon as the 
Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance is ratified by all Member States.  
51
 Tom Schalken and Maarten Pronk, ‘On Joint Investigation Teams, Europol and Supervision of and Their Joint 
Actions’ (2002) 10 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 78.   
52
 Art. 1.   
53
 Art. 1(12).  See also Art. 30 of the TEU and Art. 88 of the TFEU; Council Act Drawing Up a Protocol 
Amending the Convention on the Establishment of a European Police Office (Europol Convention) and the 
Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities of Europol, the Member of Its Organs, the Deputy Directors and 
increasingly been facilitated by Member States and EU institutions.  According to Eurojust, 
there were 122 JITs in 2014, with 45 for crime such as participation in organised criminal 
groups, money laundering as well as human and drug trafficking being formed during that 
year.54  This may be compared with 10 new JITs being set up in 200955 and 30 in 2011.56 
Moreover, the European Investigation Orders (EIOs) are also designed to facilitate 
mutual assistance in criminal matters more effectively.   To begin with, the Directive on EIOs 
was adopted as the scope of the pre-existing instruments, most notably the Framework 
Decision on the European Evidence Warrant (EEW)57 is limited.  To explain this further, the 
Framework Decision is limited to evidence which already existed and was available in the 
forms of objects, data and documents.  This means, among others, that the EEWs cannot be 
issued for interviewing suspects/witnesses as well as obtaining evidence in real time (e.g. 
through the use of special investigative techniques such as interception of communications).58  
The Directive aims to ameliorate some of the shortcomings in the European Evidence 
Warrant.  To begin with, the relevant authority in one Member State can issue an order 
authorising specific investigation measures to be facilitated in another Member States for the 
purpose of obtaining evidence.  With an exception of gathering of evidence within the 
framework of JITs,59 investigation measures under EIOs may include, but are not limited to, 
temporary transfer of suspects (Articles 22 and 23) and the use of telephone or video links 
(Articles 24 and 25) in addition to special investigative techniques mentioned above.  The 
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 Eurojust, Annual Report 2009, 34.   
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 Eurojust Annual Report 2011, 11.   
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 [2008] OJ L 350/72.  Another important instrument is the Framework Decision on execution of orders 
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 European Commission, Green Paper on Obtaining Evidence in Criminal Matters from One Member State to 
Another and Securing Its Admissibility, COM (2009) 624 final, 4.   It should also be noted that the EEW was 
implemented in only 2 States (Denmark and Finland), making this instrument ineffective.   
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 Art. 3.   
Directive also incorporates some safeguards against misuse, such as the tests of necessity and 
proportionality.60  Member States are also to respect the rights of suspects/defendants.  All in 
all, many of the international standards on international co-operation are reflected at the EU 
level.   
 
2.4 Protection of Human Rights of Victims and Perpetrators of Organised Crime 
Compared to the past, the EU and its Member States have made some progress in 
relation to protection and promotion of human rights.  To begin with, the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union61 is now legally binding on all Member States by 
virtue of the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009.  The Charter is applicable when 
the EU institutions or Member States are implementing EU law.62  The relevant rights include 
prohibition on torture, inhuman or degrading treatment (Article 4), the right to liberty and 
security (Article 6), and the right to a fair trial (Article 47), presumption of innocence (Article 
48), legality and proportionality of criminal offences and punishments (Article 49), and the 
ne bis in idem principle (Article 50).  While these are mostly relevant to the perpetrators, 
Article 47 additionally provides for access to remedy for those whose rights have been 
violated, and it seems reasonable to assume that it applies, at least, to the victims of 
transnational organised crime with human rights dimensions, such as human trafficking and 
exploitation.     
Aside from the Charter, Article 82(2) of the TFEU specifically authorises the Council 
and the European Parliament to establish minimum rules on the rights of individuals in 
criminal proceedings as well as victims of crime.  This is an important change as protection 
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of their rights was not sufficiently provided for under the previous regime.  In relation to 
protection of victims, there were two key instruments under the TEU: the Framework 
Decision on the Standing of Victims in Criminal Proceedings63 and the Directive on 
Compensation for Crime Victims.64   It has, however, been acknowledged that 
implementation of these instruments at the national level was far from satisfactory,65 and the 
need for a new instrument under the TFEU was expressed.66  In response, the European 
Parliament and the Council adopted the Directive Establishing Minimum Standards on the 
Rights, Support and Protection of Victims of Crime in 2012.67  This Directive represents an 
improvement as protection and assistance are to be provided outside of criminal proceedings.   
To begin with, Article 1 makes it clear that the ‘Directive shall apply to victims in a non-
discriminatory manner, including with respect to their residence status.’  This is significant as 
many victims of organised crime are non-EU nationals.  Measures stipulated under the 
Directive include, but are not limited to, provision of relevant information, 
interpretation/translation, access to confidential support services free of charge, legal aid, 
protection of privacy, and compensation.  It is also noteworthy that it obliges Member States 
to pay particular attention to vulnerabilities surrounding the victims of organised crime.68   
This instrument is further supplemented by subject specific instruments such as the Directives 
on Human Trafficking and Child Sexual Exploitation which contain provisions on protection 
of victims of these crimes.   
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In relation to the rights of defendants, a similar development can be recognised.  It 
was not possible to adopt an instrument on this due to oppositions expressed by some 
Member States such as the United Kingdom, Republic of Ireland and the Czech Republic.69  
In recognition of the need to strengthen their rights during criminal proceedings, the Council 
published a roadmap for enhancing procedural rights during criminal proceedings in 2009, 
which mentioned the following priority areas: translation and interpretation, information on 
rights/charges, legal advice/aid, communication with relatives, employers and consular 
authorities, special safeguards for vulnerable individuals, and pre-trial detention.70   Some of 
these measures have been formalised under the TFEU.  The relevant instruments are the 
Directives on the Right to Interpretation and Translation during Criminal Proceedings,71 on 
the Right to Information during Criminal Proceedings,72  and on the Right to Access to a 
Lawyer in Criminal and EAW Proceedings and to Communicate with a Third Persons and 
Consular Authorities.73  Proposals in relation to presumption of innocence,74 legal aid,75 and 
safeguards for children suspected of crime,76 are currently being considered and negotiated.  
Finally, the rights of defendants are further strengthened by the European Convention on 
Human Rights 1950, to which all EU Member States are Parties and the EU recently acceded.   
Many of the human rights principles mentioned earlier are indeed developed by the European 
Court of Human Rights, and therefore the Council of Europe System provides an additional 
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layer of human rights protection.  The detailed analysis of relevant human rights norms 
principles will be provided throughout this book.   
 
2.5 Critical Appraisal of the EU Action against Transnational Organised Crime  
 There is no doubt that the EU and its Member States have been more proactive in 
implementing measures against transnational organised crime individually and collectively 
compared to other regions of the world, and that the two core principles, approximation of 
national criminal laws and procedures and mutual recognition of judicial decisions, have 
gradually found their place in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.   Further, the 
relevant instruments relating to action against organised crime amply reflects the obligations 
imposed by the UNTOC.  Nevertheless, a closer look at actual implementation of a variety of 
EU legal instruments simultaneously reveals a number of issues, shortcomings and concerns.  
To begin with, approximation of national laws and criminal procedures has not been 
consistently realised.  For instance, the definitions of ‘criminal organisation’ or ‘criminal 
group’ vary among Member States.  There is no mention of a ‘structured group” under the 
Austrian,77 German,78 Hungarian79 and Slovenian80 legislation, while the Estonian81 and 
Spanish82 Criminal Codes speak of a ‘permanent organisation.’  The benefit element is not 
mention in most statutes, and the Danish and Swedish legislation do not contain a definition 
of a criminal group or organisation in line with the Framework Decision or the Organised 
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Crime Convention.83  In terms of offences relating to criminal organisations, mere 
membership (or belonging) is criminalised in Estonia84 and Greece,85 while leading or 
forming a criminal organisation are punished additionally in Bulgaria,86 Germany,87 
Romania88 and Slovenia.89    These discrepancies do not necessarily demonstrate that 
Member States have been reluctant to abide by the relevant European standards.  
Nevertheless, they certainly highlight the point expressed elsewhere that criminal offences 
are defined according to Member States’ social, political, legal cultural underpinnings.   
In relation to the punishments stipulated in various instruments, an important question 
to be asked is whether the minimum rules stipulated in the relevant instruments reflect the 
serious nature of various forms of organised crime.   In other words, are punishments 
proportionate to the offences committed?   Drug offences are not regarded as seriously in 
Europe in comparison to other regions such as Asia where many States still impose the 
capital punishment.  Consequently 1-3 years imprisonment stipulated in the Framework 
Decision on Drug Trafficking may be regarded as reasonable by the EU Member States.   
However, an argument may be made that other crimes such as human trafficking and 
exploitation should attract heavier penalties as these are widely regarded as gross violations 
of human rights.  While States impose heavier penalties in practice,90 the Directive on Human 
Trafficking could have set a higher threshold than 5 years’ imprisonment.  The same 
argument can be raised for child sex offences.91  A related question is whether these 
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punishments are sufficient to deter perpetrators from committing organised crime in future.  
The national courts do not normally impose maximum penalties particularly when 
perpetrators are first time offenders or minor players.  Other factors such as mitigating 
circumstances and co-operation with law enforcement authorities can also affect sentencing.  
Even with the imposition of custodial sentences, prisoners are often released early with parole 
arrangements.  Given the amount of profits criminals can make, spending some time in prison 
may not serve as an effective deterrence in the end.    
The State practice on punishment also reveals a great degree of divergence.  Money 
laundering in Finland attracts the maximum of 2 years’ imprisonment,92 whereas the same 
offence carries up to 5 years’ and 18 years’ imprisonment in Croatia93 and Malta94 
respectively.  The punishment for drug trafficking is imprisonment for 10 years in France,95 
2-8 years in Hungary,96 and 3-6 years in Spain.97  Further, under the Estonian Criminal Code, 
human trafficking is punished with imprisonment for between 1-7 years,98 and the same 
offence carries 4-10 years in Slovakia.99  What these examples show is that the minimum 
rules/thresholds for substantive organised crime offences as envisaged by the TEU and the 
TFEU have not necessarily been accepted by Member States, and that approximation of 
substantive criminal laws has been difficult to achieve.   The principle of State sovereignty 
therefore remains strong in this area.   
It has also not been easy to implement the principle of mutual recognition on the 
ground.  In relation to EAWs, for instance, of 99,841 EAWs issued between 2005 and 2013, 
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26,120 resulted in actual surrender of suspects or defendants.100  The majority of them 
therefore have not been enforced by Member States.  It has also been pointed out that, while 
the Member States must recognise EAWs issued by others, a decision not to execute an EAW 
is not always respected as EAWs themselves can continue to be valid.101   In addition, the 
proportionality has been raised as an ongoing problem with the EAWs because some States 
are known to issue them even for very minor offences,102 such as possession of small 
quantities of narcotics,103 while others do not.       
Aside from difficulty in facilitating two principles, the scope of some instruments 
raises concerns.  The EIO regime is the case in point.  Its scope is very wide as it can be 
issued and executed for ‘any investigative measure,’104 and it has been rightly argued that this 
can undermine the principle of legality.105  Although validation of EIOs by a ‘judicial 
authority’ can ensure impartial oversight, it has been pointed out that a public prosecutor can 
additionally be regarded as a judicial authority.106  The same argument has also been raised in 
relation to the definition of an ‘executing authority’ which may not require judicial scrutiny 
or intervention.107  Further, it has been pointed out that, due to a lack of consistent standards, 
a wide margin of appreciation is given to a judicial authority in determining the necessity and 
proportionality of investigative measures to be conducted.108  Finally, the execution of the 
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EIOs can be refused on various grounds, including national security, classified information 
relating to intelligence activities, and human rights grounds (Article 11), and this opens up 
the possibility that the mutual recognition principle is not respected in the same way as other 
instruments such as EAWs.      
In terms of State practice, the implementation of various obligations established under 
relevant instruments has not been consistent in some areas.  For instance, while the available 
evidence suggests that the Member States are increasingly relying on JITs to conduct 
investigations against organised crime as noted earlier, a number of important issues have 
been highlighted.  Some Member States avoid participation by referring to the grounds for 
refusal such as sovereignty and internal security.109  The double legal basis (both the 
Framework Decision on JITs and the Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance) also created 
some confusion among the law enforcement and judicial authorities in implementing relevant 
obligations.  To illustrate this with an example, the United Kingdom incorporated the 
Framework Decision into its domestic law, while the Netherlands uses the Convention as a 
legal basis for JITs.110  Because of this, the United Kingdom was regarded as an ineligible 
partner in JITs in the past.111  In addition, the diverse criminal procedures among Member 
States, including the rules relating to disclosure of evidence and retention of personal data, as 
well as the reluctance on the part of the law enforcement authorities to share sensitive 
intelligence, were said to have made it difficult to set up JITs.112  These suggest that mutual 
trust has not been developed by frontline law enforcement agencies.   
                                                          
109
 European Commission, supra n 83, 326.  
110
 Ibid, 332.   
111
 Ibid.   
112
 Ibid, 333-334.  See also Toine Spapens, ‘Joint Investigation Teams in the European Union: Article 13 JITs 
and the Alternatives’ (2011) 19 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 239.  
  Finally, protection and promotion of human rights of victims and perpetrators of 
transnational organised crime should be carefully assessed.  In relation to victim protection, 
some uncertainty remains for victims of organised crime who are non-EU nationals.  
Although the principle of non-discrimination stipulated in Article 1 of the Directive on 
Victims of Crime is to be welcomed, if Member States decide to repatriate or return foreign 
victims by enforcing immigration laws and regulations, support and assistance stipulated in 
the Directive become meaningless to them.   A clear example of this is access to 
compensation.  It is extremely difficult to seek compensation once non-EU victims are 
returned to their States of origin but both the Directives on Victims of Crime and on 
Compensation are silent as to how non-EU victims can receive appropriate compensation.  
These instruments should have created additional obligations to allow these victims to stay in 
Member States while receiving relevant assistance and support.  This lack of clear obligations 
can be interpreted as shifting the burden of victimisation to their States of origin.  This is not 
fair particularly when victimisation occur within the EU territories.    
As to the rights of perpetrators of transnational organised crime, various issues have 
also been highlighted.  For instance, the European Parliament has expressed its concern over 
the lack of fundamental rights safeguarded within the Framework Decision on EAWs.113  In 
particular, human rights protection has not been included as part of the mandatory refusal to 
execute EAWs under Article 3, leaving Member States with a wide margin of appreciation.114  
It has also been noted that the absence of minimum standards relating to judicial oversight 
over EAWs has led to inconsistent State practice with regard to protection of fundamental 
rights,115 in areas such as pre-trial detention and access to legal representation during 
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surrender proceedings.116  Ironically, protection of human rights has been said to create a 
degree of tension as the domestic courts may be forced to examine the human rights 
situations of other Member States in deciding whether to refuse surrender.117  Despite these 
concerns, the European Court of Justice has ruled that the principle of mutual recognition can 
take precedence over protection of human rights,118 and its decisions have rightly been 
criticised.119   
Similarly, there are several issues with the Directive on Access to a Lawyer.  
According to Article 2, the Directive is applied from the time when the suspects or accused 
persons are informed by the competent authorities that they are suspected or accused of 
having committed a criminal offence.  Article 3 further provides that suspects or accused 
persons shall have access to a lawyer before they are questioned by the police, another law 
enforcement or judicial authority.  These suggest that the Directive is applicable to the 
criminal investigation stage.  However, it has been pointed out that it does not guarantee the 
presence of a lawyer during the police interrogations.120  Indeed, the wording of Article 
3(3)(b), ‘in accordance with the procedures under national law’ gives a margin of 
appreciation on Member States to decide how the lawyer’s participation is to be secured 
during questioning.121  It has also been argued that the wording of Article 2 can be 
manipulated by the competent authorities to delay access to a lawyer by not informing the 
suspects or accused persons promptly.122   Further, when investigations take place in another 
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Member State, the right of access to a lawyer in those investigations is not always 
guaranteed.123  This also applies to EAWs proceedings as access to a lawyer is relevant only 
in executing, and not issuing, States.124  These loopholes mean that the current EU 
instruments do not sufficiently protect the rights of suspects and accused persons, and must 
be supplemented by the ECHR.125   In summary, implementation of the European standards 
on relating to action against organised crime, including promotion and protection of human 
rights, has not always been an easy task.   
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 This Chapter explored the core regional standards as represented by European Union 
Law.   It is apparent that the EU and its Member States have been instrumental in promoting 
and implementing individual and collective responses to transnational organised crime.  
Similar institutional and legal developments cannot be seen in other regions of the world such 
as Asia, Africa, the Americas and the Middle East.  Compared to the UNTOC, approximation 
(harmonisation) and mutual recognition principles have clearly been recognised and 
implemented more proactively by the EU Member States.  However, the examination of State 
practice simultaneously reveals that national implementation is not always consistent, as the 
relevant instruments allow a wide margin of appreciation on Member States.  In addition, 
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there is much to be done in terms of protecting and promoting the human rights of victims 
and perpetrators of organised crime.  The role of human rights law therefore is important 
within the EU territories also.   
 
 
